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This paper evaluates the theory of servant leadership as a viable solution 
to the Army’s sometimes toxic leadership problem. The research question 
this paper asks is: is servant leadership a viable option for official U.S. 
Army leadership doctrine? We build the case that while servant leadership 
is fundamentally incompatible with Army Leadership and is not a viable 
option for official U.S. Army leadership doctrine, some of the basic tenets 
of servant leadership are adoptable and adaptable by the U.S. Army. 
Furthermore, we recommend that the U.S. Army focus on better 
communicating their existing leadership doctrine throughout the 
organization rather than revamp it. 
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Perhaps in no other organization is leadership more important than military 
formations in combat. Victory on the battlefield is won through coordinated actions 
across a wide area. Rarely are stories found of heroic actions of a lone soldier that 
unilaterally impacted a battle. Instead, virtually all combat actions rely on the synergistic 
forces of fire and maneuver, soldiers supporting soldiers as they try to close with and 
destroy the enemy. These actions must be controlled by leaders to ensure maximum 
impact with minimum loss of life. More than the simple issuance of orders or 
deconfliction of various individual actions however, combat leaders must first convince 
soldiers to obey them despite the overwhelming risk to their personal safety.  
 
 Some may argue that Army leaders have no such need to inspire compliance as 
U.S. Army soldiers have a codified obligation to obey any lawful general order or 
regulation. This is not the case. Unlike armies of the past, the United States Army does 
not employ barrier troops to execute deserters or other soldiers that refuse a direct order. 
In fact, according to the Army’s Uniform Code of Military Justice, the set of laws and 
regulations that govern all those that serve in the Army, even during times of war, the 
consequence of refusing to obey a lawful order is a court martial. It is true that the soldier 
may be sentenced to death for his actions depending on the situation, nevertheless no one, 
direct supervisor or otherwise, can legally execute that soldier prior to his receiving a 
trial. This means that something other than fear of immediate retribution must convince 
that soldier to willingly present himself to mortal risk in accordance with orders 
(Congress, 2016). 
 
 Throughout the history of warfare, combat leaders have struggled with answering 
this question: what is the most reliable method to influence people in such a way as to 
command their obedience and loyal cooperation?  According to numerous articles, as 
well as public statements from the department of the Army itself, the US Army still has 
not cracked this code, as examples of “toxic leadership” can be found across the force 
(Reed, 2004; Steel, 2011). Toxic leaders are those that are, “abusive and self-
aggrandizing, arrogant and petty, and unconcerned about, or oblivious to, staff or troop 
morale (Zwerdling, 2014).” 
 
 The solution to this, some argue, is servant leadership (Wesson, 2013; Farmer, 
2010). Conceptualized to be the antithesis of toxic leadership, servant leadership puts the 
needs of those led first. Although the theory of servant leadership is still nascent 
compared to other leadership theories, the results from published research are promising. 
This paper evaluates the theory of servant leadership as a viable solution to the Army’s 
toxic leadership problem. 
 The research question this paper asks is: is servant leadership a viable option for 
official U.S. Army leadership doctrine? We build the case that servant leadership is 
fundamentally incompatible with Army Leadership and is not a viable option for official 
U.S. Army leadership doctrine. The contemporary discussion of this issue is framed by a 
larger historical perspective. This is a key part of our current research given that Army 
leadership development has been a crucial component of military doctrine and 
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organization since the end of World War II (WWII).  Reviewing the evolution of the U.S. 
Army’s leadership doctrine and analyzing the corresponding academic theories that drove 
its evolution offered us the lens with which to predict what a revised leadership doctrine 
of servant leadership may look like. Following this preliminary step is an evaluation of 
how the U.S. Army has, both historically and currently, addressed the dilemma posed by 
prioritizing the various responsibilities of its leaders. From there, we present a brief 
overview of the current state of the art of servant leadership. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion evaluating the merits of incorporating servant leadership into the existing U.S. 
leadership doctrine, and derived recommendations thereof are presented.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Formulation and Evolution of the Army’s Leadership Model 
The “Great Man Theory” of Leadership. Leadership was not directly addressed 
in U.S. Army doctrine for the majority of its existence. This may be due to the system of 
purchasing positions of leadership in the very early days, or perhaps due to the prevalent 
academic theories on leadership centering around hereditary traits in the “Great Man 
Theory” (Borgatta, Bales, & Couch, 1954). Whatever the cause, in the 1910 edition of the 
U.S. Army’s Field Service Regulations (FSR), the only concepts that address a subject 
approximating leadership are found in the section addressing the issuance of military 
orders. Succinctly, the regulation explains that orders “must be loyally and promptly 
obeyed.” Continuing after a description of formatting and substance, the regulation 
proceeds, “An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate…when 
orders may have to be carried out under unseen circumstances…letters of guidance are 
preferable.” This is interesting to note as it departs from the absolute power model that 
had been previously painstakingly developed which focused on obedience and discipline 
as the hallmarks of an efficient unit.  
 
The 1923 revision of the FDSR came after the conclusion of a difficult and 
bloody experience suffered by the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during World 
War I (WWI). Reflecting the lessons learned during the AEF’s brutal fight, leadership 
was, for the first time, cast as a central tenet of the new regulation. A chapter on 
command was added and the change of language from the previous doctrine was striking. 
Although leadership itself was not strictly defined, the concept of what the Army values 
as good leadership was described. Beginning with the remark, “Command and leadership 
are inseparable” the section proceeds to insist that its commanders take the time to visit 
with their subordinates to learn, “their accomplishments, their needs, and their views 
(Hunter, 1963)." After continuing to list the various ways the Army expects its leaders to 
care for and cherish the Solders in their command, it concludes that although an Army 
leader should be, “considerate and devoted to those whom he commands” he must also, 
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The next major doctrine would come in 1939. Renamed Field Manual 100-5 (FM 
100-5) instead of FSR 1939, leadership was given its own sub chapter and is listed in the 
table of contents for the first time in Army doctrine. The section, titled “Leadership,” 
begins not with an explanation of the importance of having orders followed, or advice on 
how best to develop discipline and obedience within a formation, but with an 
examination of the psychology of man. The manual claims that the average man in 
combat is “governed more by instinct than by reason (29).” It continues that his innate 
“instinct of self-preservation will induce him to flee from danger” (29) but that he may be 
persuaded to stay and fight if he has been imbued with symbolic ideals or out of a fear of 
betraying his teammates.  
 
The 1939 manual FM 100-5 continues to belabor the importance of the art of 
leadership over the science of control when it states that instilling a fear of disobedience 
in soldiers through threats of retribution is to be resorted to “only in extreme cases” (30) 
and that “it is far better to dominate demoralizing influences by inculcating in the 
individual a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in his unit, and a feeling of mutual 
obligation to his comrades in the group (30).” When explaining how a leader can develop 
these traits in soldiers, the manual instructs leaders to live among the men and share in 
the dangers and privations they face. Suffering or celebrating alongside the soldiers led 
fosters a sense of comradeship and unlocks the “full combat value” of the unit (32). 
Furthermore, the manual stresses that good morale and a sense of unity can only be 
attained if a leader treats all subordinates in a fair and just manner, and above all, 
demonstrates “a constant concern for the soldier’s welfare (33).” 
 
 Following WWII, the U.S. Army doubled-down on the importance of leadership 
when it published its first manual dedicated only to the subject of leadership. Published in 
1948 and simply titled Training Circular No 6: Leadership (TC-6), TC-6 refined the 
advice and philosophy outlined in the 1939 edition of FM 100-5 into a coherent model 
and definition of military leadership. TC 6 defined military leadership as, “the art of 
influencing and directing people to an assigned goal in such a way as to command their 
obedience, confidence, respect and loyal cooperation (1).” This appears to be an 
amalgamation of two theories on leadership emerging from the 1920s. The first, 
presented in 1929 by J.B. Nash posits “leadership implies influencing change in the 
conduct of people (Bass & Stogdill, 1990; 13)." The second is a definition of leadership 
developed in a 1927 conference. According to B.V. Moore, who attended the conference, 
leadership can be defined as, “the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and 
induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation (Gill, 2011; 6).” 
 
Also presented in TC-6 was the Army’s leadership model. The Army’s model 
likely pulled inspiration from the trait based leadership theorists of its day, including 
Ordway Tead who presented a similar leadership process in his 1935 work, “The Art of 
Leadership.” Tead’s model suggested that a good leader should have 10 traits which he 
described and that the good leader should also employ 8 different techniques. The result 
of this good leadership, Tead claimed, is the achievement, not just of cooperation towards 
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a goal, but of a sense of “self-fulfillment and satisfaction on the part of those led (Childs, 
1935; 681). The Army’s model, for its part, retained the traits and techniques concept 
from Tead’s theory, but added its own set of traits and techniques. The Army’s model 
suggests that good leadership is the result of a leader that understands the 10 principles of 
leadership, possesses the 12 major leadership traits, and then employs a set of techniques 
that are different depending on the level of the organization at which the leader currently 
stands. Interestingly, TC-6 did not include the specific techniques the Army wanted 
applied at each level (Enlisted, Platoon and Company Officers, Battalion and Regimental 
Officers, Division Officers and higher). Instead, it explained the plan for integrating 
leadership specific training into the curriculum of existing soldier training courses at 
every level (See Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Army Leadership Model from 1948  
 
The 10 principles of leadership according to TC-6 are:  
1.   Know your Job. 
2.   Know your men and look out for their welfare. 
3.   Know yourself and seek self-improvement. 
4.   Keep your men informed. 
5.   Set the example. 
6.   See that the task is understood, supervise, and follow through to see that it is carried 
out. 
7.   Train your men as a team. 
8.   Take responsibility for your actions, regardless of their outcome. 
9.   Seek responsibility and develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates by 
delegating, supervising, but intervening only when necessary. 
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The 12 Major Leadership traits are:  
1.   Knowledge 
2.   Judgement 
3.   Tact 
4.   Endurance 
5.   Initiative 
6.   Bearing 
7.   Courage 
8.   Dependability 





When the Army refined and developed its leadership doctrine in 1951 with the 
introduction of FM 22-10, it maintained the model as presented in 1948 but attempted to 
better describe implementation through the use of techniques. These were explained as 
the specific actions taken by leaders in order to accomplish the principles previously 
listed. The examples, however, did little to help Army leaders understand the nuances of 
the model because the examples were painfully specific. The manual attempted to 
provide leadership techniques for such a numerous and broad spectrum of scenarios that 
the manual came off as confusing and overwhelming. For example, “what should a leader 
do when minorities are present?” (“Develop an understanding of minority group 
problems and feelings by observation and study” [p. 64]) or what should a leader do 
when in combat? (“Indoctrinate [the soldiers] with the necessity for maintaining the 
momentum of the attack” [p. 38]). Furthermore, the manual vacillates between leadership 
theory (“Practice the ‘Golden Rule’ [p. 20]”) and tactical military maxims (“Lack of 
firepower is uneconomical and must be compensated for by commitment of 
disproportionate forces [p. 38]"). 
 
In 1953, the Army released FM 22-100. The new manual reintroduced the same 
leadership model from the previous doctrine, but addressed the weakness of FM 22-10 
head on. Instead of attempting to provide example techniques for as many situations as 
possible, the manual focuses on describing the functioning of the model and a handful of 
example techniques for each leadership principle. Then, the manual presents a decision-
making process and indicators to look for in your formation to determine the success or 
failure of your leadership techniques. This presents a much more coherent manual from 
which to understand the Army’s leadership model and even includes case studies of 
leadership with analyses from combat situations in the appendix.  
The Behaviorist Approach to Leadership. The first significant changes to the 
Army Leadership Model did not appear until the revision of FM 22-100 in 1958. The 
behaviorist theory of leadership was currently in vogue and was adopted by the Army 
through its leadership doctrine. Instead of merely stating that leaders are not born but 
made, an entire chapter is devoted to the explanation of human behavior. This chapter 
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included steps that soldiers can take in order to develop these behaviors, reiterating that 
they are not hereditary but learned. The 1958 revision of FM 22-100 included a new 
model of leadership. Although less clear in respect to the relationship between traits, 
principles, techniques and indicators, the new model does clarify the mechanism by 
which leadership affects unit effectiveness and contributes to mission accomplishment 
(See Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Army Leadership Model from 1958 
   Although additional clarifications and an improved decision-making process 
were added in the 1961 revision, the Army Leadership Model was not substantially 
modified again until 1965.  
 
Contingency Leadership. The 1965 edition of the field manual introduced a new 
leadership theory: that of situational leadership. This edition described the elements of 
leadership in terms of the leader, the group, and the situation. The manual explains how a 
group’s response to leadership techniques changes in different situations. It suggests a 
more comprehensive analysis of the various elements will dictate which techniques are 
feasible to implement. Although clearly a consolidation of various studies and theories, 
this seems to directly reflect the findings of Feidler’s Contingency Theory of Leadership 
which was published in his 1958 paper, “Leader Attitudes and Group Effectiveness.” The 
section of situational leadership stresses the adaptability of the leader and adds 
supervision as an element to the model as seen in figure 3, but otherwise does not make 
any substantive changes to the existing model.  
 
 In 1983, the Army released a revised edition of FM 22-100 and did not include a 
visual model of its leadership framework. Instead, the Army created the concept of "Be, 
Know, Do.” This framework can be found in Appendix A. As a part of this model, the 
Army included the traits of a good leader, as well as the values and character aspects 
mentioned in previous doctrine into what a leader must “Be.” “Know” includes principles 
previously espoused as well as knowledge of leadership theories and an understanding of 
the various elements of leadership. “Do” comprises the actions or techniques a leader 
employs in order to provide soldiers with the purpose, direction, and motivation 
necessary to accomplish the mission. The 1990 revision to FM 22-100 continued to refine 
the new Be, Know, Do Framework. Furthermore, it introduced an additional element to 
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the contingency portion of the model. Instead of three “elements of Leadership” now the 
Army had four “factors of Leadership:” the led, the leader, the situation, and 
communications (44-45). 
 
 Transformational Leadership - Important Component of Contingency 
Leadership. In August of 1999, the Army revised FM 22-100 and renamed the manual, 
“Army Leadership: BE, KNOW, DO” The Framework itself was virtually unchanged, but 
the presentation was refined to include a reintroduction of a visual model to describe the 
concept. The new model demonstrates the relationship between the Army values and its 
leadership philosophy. Although the new manual omits the “factors of leadership” it does 
discuss various leadership styles, reflecting the new focus of this model on 
transformational leadership. Heavily influenced by a 1996 study published by Bernard 
Bass on the effectiveness of transformational leadership in the Army, the manual 
describes transactional vs transformational leadership and concludes: “the most effective 
leaders combine techniques from the transformational and transactional leadership styles 
to fit the situation” (See Figure 3). 
 
  
Figure 3: Army Leadership Model from 1999 
 
In 2006, the Army abandoned the Be, Know, Do framework for a model named 
the Army Leadership Requirements Model (Figure 4). The Army described 12 attributes 
that determine what an Army leader should be, and the 8 competencies a leader must do. 
The Manual explains that the most important outcome is “values based leadership” and 
this is reflected by the reducing of its model into two categories. In short, if an ethical 
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leader adhering to the Army values exhibits the eight core competencies, he or she is an 
effective Army leader.  
 
 
Figure 4: Army Leadership Model from 2006 
The most recent revision to the Army leadership doctrine came in 2012 with the 
introduction of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (ADRP 6-22) which included 
a refinement and modification to the Competencies, expanding the number of 
competencies from eight to ten through the introduction of the competencies “Builds 
Trust” and “Stewards the Profession” (See Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Army Leadership Model from 2012 
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The Common Thread in Army Leadership Doctrine: The Mission vs. 
the Men 
 As can be seen through the development of the Army Leadership Model, the 
relationship between a commander and his men is of crucial importance. When a conflict 
between the two priorities arises, which takes precedence, the mission or the men? This is 
a question with which the Army has wrestled for over 100 years. Prior to the introduction 
of formal doctrine dedicated to discussing leadership, the answer was implicitly the 
mission. References to soldiers found in the Army’s Field Service Regulations suggest 
that commanders should view their men as a means to an end. In other words, leadership 
is important because it allows soldiers to be most effective.   
 
In 1951, the Department of the Army made the decision to supersede the 10-page 
leadership pamphlet that was TC-6 with a 65-page field manual known as FM 22-10. 
This new manual augmented the information in TC-6 with additional definitions, a 
discussion of the relationship between leadership and command, and the inclusion of the 
specific techniques that were noticeably absent from TC-6. Perhaps the most relevant 
change comes in the first chapter of FM 22-10, where the Department of the Army makes 
clear the responsibilities of Army leaders: “The primary duty of the leader is the 
accomplishment of his assigned mission. Everything else, even the welfare of his men, is 
subordinate (6).” This strong and decisive clarification as to the responsibility of leaders 
is not matched by anything in TC-6. With this established, the manual then explains that, 
although a subordinate duty, the leader does have a duty to his men. It had previously 
explained that a good leader must be concerned with the “desires, needs, and mental state 
of his men (5).”  
Just two years after publishing FM 22-10, the Army published an updated 
manual with a focus on small unit leaders: FM 22-100.  The Army again stated the 
primacy of the mission accomplishment in respect to a military leader’s duties, but this 
time softened the language substantially and put greater emphasis on the respect of the 
humanity and innate dignity of soldiers.  The next revision FM 22-100 in 1958 further 
erodes the primacy of the mission with this curious paragraph:  
 
The Commander has two basic responsibilities; accomplishment of his mission, 
and welfare of his men. These basic responsibilities are of equal importance. 
However, in the event a conflict arises in the mind of the commander regarding 
these responsibilities, the mission must take precedence (11).  
 
   The inclusion of the preceding paragraph in the 1958 edition is important to note 
because it marks the first time the Army claimed welfare of soldiers is of equal 
importance as an end of itself and not merely as a means to mission accomplishment. 
Three years later, in the 1961 edition, the Army maintains that its leaders have two basic 
responsibilities. This time, however, the wording expressing the equivalency of the 
mission and the men has been removed. Instead, the manual states: “of the two, 
accomplishment of the mission is preeminent. Nevertheless, the leader in accomplishing 
his mission to the highest degree will always consider the welfare of his men (7).” This 
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does communicate the message that the men are not merely a means to an end, but it 
leaves no doubt the hierarchy of responsibility. This sentiment echoes the introduction of 
the manual which described accomplishment of the mission as the “ultimate objective of 
military leadership (2).”  
 
 The 1965 revision of FM 22-100 may not have updated the definition of 
leadership, but the discussion of basic leader responsibilities was again updated. 
...the commander’s two basic responsibilities [are] the accomplishment of the 
mission, and looking out for the welfare of the men… In most situations, these 
two responsibilities are of equal importance. When a conflict exists, 
accomplishment of the mission must take precedence over the welfare of the 
men. Even here, however, the leader must consider the manner in which the 
accomplishment of his mission will simultaneously permit a maximum 
contribution toward the welfare of his men (6). 
 
 In 1983, the Department released a major doctrinal update that included FM 22-
100. In the 1983 revision, the Army omitted any direct discussion of the responsibility of 
Army leaders. In fact, the Army did not include a dedicated section to addressing this 
dilemma until 2006. Even the section titled, “definition of military leadership” expanded 
to three paragraphs in the 1983 edition, focuses on a leader’s reflection in his soldier’s 
eyes. The leadership definition section describes self-serving leaders as ineffective and 
expounds on what a leader must do to earn the respect of his men. It even goes so far as 
to say that soldiers sense, “if you are an honorable leader or a self-serving phony who 
misuses his authority to look good and get promoted (44).” Reading the introduction to 
the manual, however, reveals a sentence which is telling: “In time of war you must be 
able to inspire your soldiers to sacrifice self-interest—possibly to sacrifice their lives—to 
carry out missions for the greater good… (1)." This strongly implies that mission 
accomplishment is the leader’s highest responsibility. Moreover, this seems to suggest 
that the manual’s focus on earning the respect of soldiers is a means towards achieving 
compliance when it counts the most.  
 
 In the 1990 revision to FM 22-100, the situation alluded to in the previous 
introduction was given its own section and labeled, “The Battlefield Challenge: Inspire 
soldiers to do things against their natural will—to carry out missions for the greater good 
of the unit, the Army, and the country (1)” Where the 1983 edition focused on welfare of 
the men as a lens through which to explain the majority of leadership effectiveness, the 
1990 edition put substantially more onus on the leader. It directs leaders to “put the 
nation’s welfare and mission accomplishment ahead of the personal safety of you and 
your troops (29).” It is stated, however, that the Army will not tolerate self-serving 
leaders. The leader’s priorities of responsibility can be discerned from the following 
passage: “As a leader, you must be the greatest servant in your unit. Your rank and 
position are not personal rewards, you earn them so that you can serve your subordinates, 
your unit, and your nation (30)." With the prior knowledge that mission is most crucial, 
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this suggests that the leader should place the welfare of the nation first, and the men and 
the unit to which they belong, second.   
 
The 1999 edition of FM 22-100 again reevaluated the responsibilities of its 
leaders. When introducing the concept, the 1990 edition states: “the nation, as well as the 
members of the Army, hold commanders accountable for accomplishing the mission, 
keeping the institution sound, and caring for its people (1-14).” This signals a shift once 
again in the Army’s view of leadership and a return to soldiers as an end in themselves. 
Expounding on this later in the manual, a crucial pair of questions are posed, but both left 
unanswered:  
 
Sending soldiers in harm’s way, into places where they may be killed or 
wounded, might seem to contradict all the emphasis on taking care of soldiers. 
Does it? How can you truly care for your comrades and send them on missions 
that might get them killed (3-3)? 
 
 Instead of answering either question, the manual recommends readers, “consider 
this important and fundamental point as you read the next few paragraphs (3-3).” The 
manual then proceeds to discuss the difficulty in defining the concept of “taking care of 
soldiers” and recommends difficult realistic training as a means to prepare soldiers for the 
rigors of combat (3-3). Finally, at the end of the section, the manual explains that 
soldier’s comforts are important in the maintenance of morale but must take a back seat 
to the mission before transitioning to a case study from WWII who survived difficult 
experiences due to the aggressive execution of a tactically sound plan. The very inclusion 
of the questions highlights the fact that this is an issue with which the Army has wrestled 
as it codifies its doctrine.  
 
 In 2006, the Army revised FM 6-22 and reintroduced a dedicated section to 
addressing the balance between mission accomplishment and the welfare of soldiers. 
Interestingly, the Army readdresses the questions posed in 1999. Unfortunately, the 
manual again fails to provide a substantial response: 
 
Sending Soldiers or civilians in harm’s way to accomplish the mission seems to 
contradict all the emphasis on taking care of people. How can a leader truly care 
for comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed? Similarly, 
when asking junior officers and NCOs to define what leaders do, the most 
common response is, “take care of soldiers (7-10). 
 
The passage, which included five paragraphs, describes the bond between the 
leader and the led, the importance of leading from the front and providing for the basic 
needs of soldiers, as well as investing time to get to know soldiers on a personal level. 
The final paragraph describes leader’s taking such actions and demonstrating love for his 
subordinates as, “one way to gain influence and commitment from followers (7-11)." 
This suggests that the Army has relegated soldiers as a means to accomplishing an end 
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once again. This supposition is further supported in Chapter 3 of the 2006 edition which 
describes the roles of Army leaders: “All Army leaders, Soldiers, and Army civilians 
share the same goals: to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies…by 
providing effective Army landpower to combatant commanders and to accomplish their 
organization’s mission in peace and war (3-1)." 
 
 The most recent revision to the Army’s leadership doctrine came in August 2012 
with the introduction of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22. This manual makes 
few changes to the Army’s stance on men vs mission. The “Balancing Mission and 
Welfare” section returned and was virtually unchanged. The question, “How can a leader 
truly care for comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed?” returned 
and remains unanswered (6-6). The Army included a summary of the passage in the table 
which can be seen below (Figure 6). Additionally, the description of taking care of 
soldiers as a means to “encourage commitment from followers” was retained which 
supports the conclusion which is that after a century of consideration, the Army maintains 
that soldier welfare is a crucial means toward the end of mission accomplishment (6-6). 
 
 
Figure 3: The  U.S. Army's Balancing Mission & Welfare Doctrine  
 
The State of the Art of Servant Leadership 
Servant leadership is a leadership theory introduced by Robert Greenleaf in his 
1970 essay, “The Servant as Leader (Greenleaf, 1970).” Presented as more of a 
philosophy for leaders to adopt rather than a definite leadership model to employ, a 
servant leader is best described as a leader that is servant first, in that he or she wishes to 
serve, and accepts the mantle of leader as a means of doing so. The theory has grown in 
popularity since the 1970s and various theorists have more narrowly defined the concept 
of servant leadership as well as developing various models for its implementation.  
 
In fact, the definition and model of servant leadership, has proven to be elusive. 
So much so, that numerous papers have been published attempting to determine a 
definition and model with which to enable empirical research. Unfortunately, there 
remains no consensus within the servant leadership community of one definition or 
definitive model (van Dierendonck, 2011). For our analysis, the definition of servant 
leadership used will be that of Jim Laub which is widely accepted: “Servant leadership is 
an understanding and practice of leadership that places the good of those led over the 
self-interest of the leader (Laub, 2004; 3)." 
 
With servant leadership thus defined, it’s necessary to choose a proper servant 
leadership framework which could potentially be applied to the Army. Larry Spears’ 
13
Gain and Bryant: The Men or the Mission
Published by CSU ePress,
102 GAIN & BRYANT  
 
© 2020 D. Abbott Turner College of Business. 
“Ten Characteristics of a Servant Leader” are generally regarded as “the essential 
elements of servant leadership (van Dierendonck, 2011; 1231)." Although there are 
various other tools for describing servant leadership, Spears’ characteristics provide an 
adequate basis from which to explore the concept of servant leadership for the purpose of 
our analysis. Spears’ ten characteristics of servant leadership are: listening, empathy, 
healing, awareness, persuasion, conceptualization, foresight, stewardship, commitment to 
the growth of people, and building community (Spears, 2010). 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted and published attempting to determine 
the discriminate validity of servant leadership. Among the most common theories with 
which servant leadership is compared is transformational leadership (Barbuto & 
Wheeler, 2014; Stone, Russell, & Patterson, 2004; van Dierendonck, 2011; Peterson, 
Galvin, & Lange, 2012; Parolini, Patterson, & Winston, 2009). In each of these studies 
it was determined that servant leadership is a distinct leadership theory which is not 
merely a different application of an existing other leadership theory. The study 
conducted by Paterson and her colleagues in 2012 found that servant leadership 
accounted for, “firm performance over and beyond transformational leadership 
(Peterson et al., 2012).”  
 
Furthermore, there appears to be a consensus among scholars in the field that 
although servant leadership and transformational leadership have “relatively analogous 
characteristics” they are decidedly different theories (Stone et al., 2004). The 
difference, it was decided, is in the focus of the leader (van Dierendonck, 2011). In 
servant leadership, the ultimate focus of the leader is on the subordinates themselves 
(Stone et al., 2004). The organization itself or its ends do not matter outside of the 
context of the subordinate’s welfare. In other words, a servant leader’s investment in 
the pursuit of organizational goals is incidental to their investment in the employees 
themselves. If the company fails, the employees will lose their income, etc. 
Conversely, with a transformational leader, employees are developed as a means to 
achieving organizational goals (van Dierendonck, 2011). 
DISCUSSION 
The Army Requirements Model, as we have seen, was deeply influenced by 
various leadership theories throughout its development. The most recent revisions heavily 
reflected the characteristics and models of transformational leadership. As a result of the 
similar qualities shared between transformational and servant leadership, Spears’ 
characteristics of servant leadership can already be seen represented within the leadership 
attributes and competencies found in existing Army doctrine. Appendix A demonstrates 
this with included passages from the corresponding references. 
 
 As previously discussed, the Army has adjusted its leadership doctrine to account 
for lessons learned through analysis of its own experiences during times of war, as well 
as to incorporate the growing body of research conducted in both the civilian and military 
sectors which suggest most effective leadership practices and models. This paper also 
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explored the Army’s endeavor to reconcile the dual responsibilities of its leaders, the 
welfare of the men vs the accomplishment of the mission. It has been seen that after 
actively contemplating the subject, the Army has determined that the mission must come 
before the welfare of soldiers. When considering the overall mission of the U.S. Army is, 
“to fight and win our Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance 
across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict (Army, 2017)," this 
decision makes sense. The Army’s doctrine has correctly contented for decades that it is 
unrealistic to assume that leaders in combat will not be forced to make tough decisions in 
regard to their soldier’s wellbeing.  
 
 Soldiers in combat exist to “close with and destroy the enemy” in pursuit of our 
nation’s interests (Headquarters, 2016; 1-19). These interests can prove to be the combat 
of an existential threat, but as von Clausewitz once said, war can just as likely be a 
"continuation of state policy by other means (von Clausewitz, 1940; 8)." In such a 
situation, it is difficult to understand how a servant leader could rationalize ordering his 
soldiers to take an action that could mean certain death. Such scenarios are not merely 
hyperbole. Consider Major General “Black Jack” Pershing ordering his soldiers into 
battle on the western front of WWI. He could have had no doubt that numerous of his 
soldiers would not survive the month, yet the mission demanded it. If a Platoon Leader 
that day had been a servant leader, what would have been the rationale? The war was 
fought for dubious reasons, but the U.S. Army was given its orders (Joll, 1999). Could 
the platoon leaders ordering his soldiers “over the top” and into the teeth of the German 
machine guns be a servant leader?  
 
 The Army tried to rationalize some way to reword or reconsider the realities of 
war in order to develop a leadership model that placed the welfare of its soldiers on an 
equal footing with the execution and attainment of organizational goals. It failed. 
Although a noble ambition, the terrible nature of war necessitates the willing expenditure 
of human lives. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “there has never been, nor ever ever 
be, any such thing as a good war, or a bad peace (Franklin, 1817; 107)." War will always 
be a bad deal for soldiers. Soldiers’ lives are risked in pursuit of national objectives. This 
extreme price being paid necessitates an absolute premium on those objectives being 
attained. To fail the mission is to relegate the sacrifice worthless.  
 
 As demonstrated throughout this paper, the Army has inculcated the majority of 
the characteristics found in servant leadership theory. A servant leader reading Army 
leadership doctrine would be struck by the time and effort spent ensuring Army leaders 
understand the enormous responsibility placed upon their shoulders in regards to taking 
care of soldiers. Soldiers are the husbands and wives, sons and daughters of ordinary 
citizens. With the Selective Service System still in place, it is important to remember that 
Army leaders may be tasked with leading soldiers that never volunteered for the horror to 
which they are subjected. Although every effort should be made to accomplish the 
mission at minimum cost to human life (as the doctrine repeatedly stresses) it would be 
disingenuous to modify Army doctrine to incorporate servant leadership in its entirety as 
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a result of the fundamental impossibility of shifting leader focus off of the mission, and 
onto the best interest of its soldiers.  
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the Army refrain from replacing 
existing Army leadership doctrine with a servant leadership model. With that said, there 
may be ways in which the existing model can be modified to reflect the growing body of 
evidence that servant leadership can improve various aspects of firm performance. 
Already Army doctrine contains phrasing and concepts found in servant leadership theory 
and more research is needed to determine the advantages of continuing to adjust the 
existing model. A study which tests the effectiveness of Army leaders that are taught and 
indoctrinated with the attributes and competencies as they are currently written vs Army 
leaders that execute the current doctrine rewritten to reflect servant leadership more 
closely could prove useful. For example, instead of merely describing active listening as 
a necessary antecedent to “building trust,” perhaps introducing active listening as a 
standalone competency could help leaders better model servant leader type behaviors.  
 
  More useful, perhaps, would be to better implement the existing doctrine. The 
“toxic leaders” mentioned in the introduction do exist within the Army ranks today. We 
posit that their existence is not due to substantial weaknesses in the Army’s leadership 
model, but rather in the failure of the Army to reward desired behaviors, attributes, and 
outcomes. To quote FM 22-100, “As a leader, you must be the greatest servant in your 
unit. Your rank and position are not personal rewards, you earn them so that you can 
serve your subordinate, your unit, and your nation (1990, 30).” Although the Army has 
incorporated practices associated with servant leadership such as the inclusion of 360 
assessments on its leaders, command climate considerations are not considered as a 
prerequisite for promotion neither are they incorporated into soldier evaluation reports. 
This fails to reward leaders of the type the Army has determined it wants and instead 
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Characteristics of Servant Leadership  
(Spears, 2010) 
Army Leadership Attribute/Competency  
(ADRP 6-22, 2012) 
Listening 
The servant leader seeks to identify the 
will of a group and helps to clarify that 
will. He or she listens receptively to 
what is being said and unsaid. Listening 
also encompasses hearing one’s own 
inner voice. 
Builds Trust 
Leaders should utilize meaningful 
communication among involved parties to 
inquire, acknowledge, and advocate while 
demonstrating active listening and 
understanding while shaping perceptions and 
emotions of all parties 
 
Empathy 
The servant leader strives to understand 
and empathize with others. People need 
to be accepted and recognized for their 
special and unique spirits. 
Empathy 
Army leaders show empathy when they 
genuinely relate to another person’s situation, 
motives, and feelings. Empathy allows the 
leader to anticipate what others are 
experiencing and to try to envision how 
decisions or actions affect them. 
 
Healing 
Servant leaders are adept at healing 
others as well as themselves. They help 
make others whole by facilitating the 
healing of broken spirits. 
Leads Others 
A commander’s primary responsibility for 
unit sustainment is to ensure the readiness, 
health, morale, welfare, and discipline of the 
unit. Every leader has a role in supporting that 
responsibility. Leaders must identify at-risk 




The servant leader seeks to convince 
others, rather than coerce compliance 
Leads Others 
Commitment generally produces longer 
lasting and broader effects. Whereas 
compliance only affects a follower’s behavior, 
commitment reaches deeper—changing 
attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. One caution is 
that punishment should be used sparingly and 




The leader who wishes to also be a 
servant leader must stretch his or her 
Prepares Self 
Understands the contribution of concentration, 
critical thinking, 
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Appendix A: Comparison of Servant Leadership to ARLM 
thinking to encompass broader-based 
conceptual thinking. 
imagination, and problem solving in different 
task conditions. 
Foresight 
Foresight is a characteristic that enables 
the servant leader to understand the 
lessons from the past, the realities of the 
present, and the likely consequence of a 
decision for the future. 
Gets Results 
Leaders should provide guidance from both 
near-term and long-term perspectives; Leaders 
need to encourage a performance 
improvement mindset that allows for 
conformity but goes beyond meeting 




CEO’s, staffs, and trustees all played 
significant roles in holding their 
institutions in trust for the greater good 
of society. 
Stewards the Profession 
Leaders serving as good stewards have 
concern for the lasting effects of their 
decisions about all of the resources they use 
and manage. Stewardship requires 
prioritization and sacrifice. 
 
Commitment to the growth of People 
The servant leader is deeply committed 
to the growth of each and every 
individual within his or her 
organization. The servant leader 
recognizes the tremendous responsibility 
to do everything in his or her power to 
nurture the personal and professional 
growth of employees and colleagues. 
Develops Others  
Leaders will fully support available 
developmental opportunities, nominate and 
encourage subordinates for those 
opportunities, help remove barriers to 
capitalize on opportunities, and reinforce the 
new knowledge and skills once they return. 
The Army creates positive learning 
environments at all levels to support its 
lifelong learning strategy. 
 
Building Community 
The servant leader seeks to identify 
some means for building community 
among those who work within a given 
institution. 
Creates a Positive Environment 
Leaders establish a climate consistent with the 
culture of the institution. Leaders use the 
culture to let members of the organization 




General awareness, and especially self-
awareness, strengthens the servant-
leader 
Prepares Self 
leaders must be able to formulate accurate 
self-perceptions, gather feedback on others’ 
perceptions, and change their self-concept as 
appropriate. Being self-aware ultimately 
requires leaders to develop a clear, honest 
picture of their capabilities and limitations. 
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